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COLLECTIVE BARGAINING, EQUALITY AND MIGRATION: 
THE JOURNEY TO AND FROM BREXIT  
 
TONIA NOVITZ* 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
Bob Simpson has documented the evolution of collective labour laws in the United Kingdom 
(UK) over several decades and his scholarship reminds us of their intended and unintended 
consequences. In the highly politically charged context of the 2016 Brexit vote, this article 
considers how UK and EU laws have shaped the nature and scope of collective bargaining in 
the UK and, thereby, income differentials and equal treatment in the workplace. While it 
would be possible to provide for equality of treatment between local British and migrant 
labour in ways that reduce social tensions, instead we have witnessed the imposition of legal 
frameworks that place workers in a position of competition rather than solidarity. The 
mistrust of current forms of migration from the EU seems to have been one key part of the 
journey towards the Brexit vote. An important question is what comes afterwards. If Brexit 
does not proceed, we should be contemplating reform at both UK and EU levels; but the 
problems identified here seem unlikely to evaporate in the event of either ‘soft’ or ‘hard’ 
Brexit. The article concludes that the UK situation offers a salutary reminder to other 
European Union (EU) States of the dangers of dismantling systems of sectoral bargaining and 
mechanisms for extension of collective agreements.   
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1. INTRODUCTION – WHERE DID THE JOURNEY TO BREXIT BEGIN? 
 
Bob Simpson has documented the legislative changes made to British collective labour law 
over several decades. His careful and detailed critical analysis offers us insights into how 
legislative and judicial initiatives that seek to restrict collective bargaining can have both 
intended and unintended results. For example, his empirical work with Jane Elgar has shown 
the potential distorting effects of legislative reforms relating to industrial action, alongside 
their multiple consequences.1 This article argues that the legislative changes since the 1980s 
he has documented have had not only palpable effects on the British labour market, but also, 
in combination with EU law, consequences for our society and politics. These consequences 
are examined here with respect to the issues of inequality and migration. My emphasis is 
perhaps less on the close analysis of specific legislative provisions and case law offered by 
Bob’s scholarship, and more on identification of the broader trends that have dominated UK 
and EU legal developments affecting collective bargaining and industrial action. In so doing, 
this article draws on the writing of industrial relations specialists and other social scientists 
who have engaged in empirical work, which provides evidence regarding the operation and 
effects of UK and EU law.  
 
It seems evident, even to the collective labour lawyer, that the most significant legal 
development of 2016 was not the notorious Trade Union Act,2 but the outcome of the Brexit 
referendum. On Thursday 23 June 2016, 52% of those who voted expressed the desire that 
Britain leave the European Union (EU). As the new Prime Minister, Theresa May, has said 
subsequently ‘Brexit means Brexit’, although the terms of negotiation still remain unclear.3 
At the time of writing, a judgment has been delivered to the effect that Parliament must 
approve the terms on which any notice is given to leave under Article 50 of the Treaty on 
                                                          
1 See J. Elgar and B. Simpson, ‘The Impact of the Law on Industrial Disputes in the 1980s’ 
(Centre for Economic Performance Discussion Paper 1994); and B. Simpson and J. Elgar, 
‘The Impact of the Law on Industrial Disputes Revisited: A Perspective on Developments 
over the Last Two Decades’, this volume. 
2 See the special issue of the ILJ vol. 45(3) (2016). 
3 http://www.theguardian.com/politics/2016/aug/01/no-10-brexit-means-brexit-tory-peer-
lady-wheatcroft-lords-delay (accessed 9 November 2016); regarding current reports of splits 
in Conservative government cabinet, see 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2016/10/08/cabinet-split-over-handling-of-brexit/ (accessed 
9 November 2016); and https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2016/oct/17/philip-hammonds-
brexit-worries-point-to-cabinet-tensions (accessed 9 November 2016).   
3 
 
European Union (TEU).4 Nevertheless, May’s Government has indicated an intention to 
appeal to the Supreme Court and to deliver Article 50 notice in March 2017, as previously 
stated.5   
 
Shortly after the Brexit referendum, a study by the Joseph Rowntree Foundation (JRF) found 
links between household income and support for a Leave vote. Those earning less than 
£20,000 per year were much more likely to vote for Brexit, which was consistent with past 
findings linking a lack of wage growth to support for the UK Independence Party (UKIP).6 
Notably, the authors of the JRF report observed:  
Groups of voters who have been pushed to the margins of our society, live on low 
incomes and lack the skills that are required to adapt and prosper amid a post-
industrial and global economy, were more likely than others to endorse Brexit. 
Looking ahead it is likely that persistent and growing inequalities will strengthen this 
divide.7    
 
Another factor in explaining voting preferences seems to be anti-immigrant sentiment. The 
JRF reported that 88% of people who supported Brexit also thought that the country should 
allow in fewer immigrants.8 It was not the level of immigration in a given geographical area 
which appeared to promote this sentiment (more cosmopolitan cities like London and Bristol 
were less likely to vote for Brexit), but rather whether there had been rapid levels of change 
which appeared to affect voters’ job prospects and their terms of hire in the labour market. 
These were places such as the Midlands, the North and parts of Wales.9 
 
                                                          
4 Miller and Dos Santos v Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union & ors 
CO/3809/2016; CO/3281/2016 QBD, judgment as at 3 November 2016 available at: 
https://www.judiciary.gov.uk/judgments/r-miller-v-secretary-of-state-for-exiting-the-
european-union/ (accessed 9 November 2016). 
5 See http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-37868987  (accessed 9 November 2016).  
6 M. Godwin and O. Heath, ‘Brexit Vote Explained: Poverty, Low Skills and Lack of 
Opportunities’ Joseph Rowntree Foundation (JRF), 31 August 2016, available at: 
https://www.jrf.org.uk/report/brexit-vote-explained-poverty-low-skills-and-lack-opportunities 
(accessed 9 November 2016). 
7 Ibid. 
8 Ibid. See also http://www.newstatesman.com/politics/staggers/2016/07/four-ways-anti-
immigration-vote-won-referendum-brexit (accessed 9 November 2016); and also Gerard 
Delanty, 'Fear of Others: Social Exclusion and the European Crisis of Solidarity' (2008) 42 
Social Policy & Administration 676, 677. 
9 JRF report n.6 above. 
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In the aftermath of the referendum, there was a significant increase in the number of racially 
motivated attacks on perceived foreigners.10 Yet policy initiatives taken by the current 
Conservative government have failed to reduce nationalistic attitudes, and could even be 
alleged to have inflamed popular forms of prejudice. At present, for example, a census is 
underway which aims to document the numbers of ‘foreign’ children attending schools.11 
Despite the ability of parents to opt out, its creation has prompted fears, given recent use of 
such data for Home Office immigration and deportation purposes.12 At the Conservative 
Party conference, the Home Secretary, Amber Rudd, announced that employers should be 
required to make public the numbers of ‘foreign’ workers employed by them, effectively to 
name and shame those not offering jobs to British workers,13 although Theresa May claimed 
shortly afterwards that there was never an actual policy to this effect.14 Further, instructions 
that non-UK nationals were not to offer academic expertise to the government on a 
consultancy basis regarding Brexit-related issues was leaked by the London School of 
Economics (LSE), although later strongly denied by the Foreign and Commonwealth 
Office.15  
 
What then do these developments have to do with collective labour law? It is argued here 
that, while this receives little attention in contemporary debates, we are witnessing the social 
and economic effects of growing inequality, which are at least partially attributable to the 
gradual collapse in UK sectoral collective bargaining. Also driving anti-immigrant feeling 
may be the experience of greater exposure to competition from short-term migrant workers 
under the EU’s posted worker regime, while being unable to organise effectively to preserve 
                                                          
10 http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/brexit-racism-uk-post-referendum-racism-
hate-crime-eu-referendum-racism-unleashed-poland-racist-a7160786.html and 
https://www.theguardian.com/society/2016/sep/07/hate-surged-after-eu-referendum-police-
figures-show (accessed 9 November 2016) which indicate a surge in hate crimes by 58%. 
11 http://schoolsweek.co.uk/school-census-2016-how-should-schools-collect-nationality-data/  
and https://www.theguardian.com/education/2016/oct/08/boycottschoolcensus-why-parents-
are-refusing-to-reveal-their-childs-nationality (accessed 9 November 2016). 
12 https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2016/oct/12/individual-childrens-details-passed-to-
home-office-for-immigration-purposes (accessed 9 November 2016). 
13 http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2016/10/04/jeremy-hunt-nhs-doctors-theresa-may-
conservative-conference-live/ (accessed 9 November 2016).  
14 http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/theresa-may-denies-lists-of-foreign-
workers-idea-was-ever-government-policy-a7357501.html (accessed 9 November 2016).  
15 https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2016/oct/07/lse-brexit-non-uk-experts-foreign-
academics (accessed 9 November 2016).  
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jobs and promote better pay and conditions. Here, we return to Bob Simpson’s observations 
regarding intended and unintended consequences.  
 
Effective representation in trade unions, especially where there is sectoral bargaining, has the 
capacity to foster solidarity, flattens wage inequalities and assists in productivity.16 In the 
long journey to Brexit from the 1980s onwards, we witnessed a move away from sectoral 
bargaining in the UK alongside increasing restrictions on the right to strike, which was 
intended to boost the profitability of British employers.17 In the EU, in an endeavour to build 
a post-enlargement common market of 28 Member States, the Court of Justice sought to 
restrict industrial action and the application of collective agreements.18 The interaction of UK 
and EU laws has arguably had a profound chilling effect on trade union activities, when 
compared to other collective bargaining regimes more suited to the prescriptions of the Court 
and Posted Workers Directive.19 These regulatory strategies may exacerbate troubling 
inequalities in ways that benefit neither migrant nor domestic workers. Indeed, it appears that 
setting these two groups of workers in opposition has had profound social and political 
ramifications. 
 
There are other possible and arguably preferable approaches to UK and EU industrial 
relations. An alternative might be, generally, to promote collective bargaining within the UK 
                                                          
16 See the summary of relevant literature in L. Hayes and T. Novitz, Trade Unions and 
Economic Inequality (London/Liverpool: Class/Institute of Employment Rights, 2014). See 
also J. Visser, ‘What Happened to Collective Bargaining During the Great Recession?’ 
(2016) 5:9 IZA Journal of Labor Policy available at 
http://link.springer.com/article/10.1186/s40173-016-0061-1 (accessed 9 November 2016). He 
points to the effects of a decline in sectoral bargaining and absence of legal mechanisms for 
extension of collective agreements across a sector, discussed further below.  
17 See W. Brown, S. Deakin and P. Ryan, ‘The Effects of British Industrial Relations 
Legislation 1979-97’ (1997) 161(1) National Institute Economic Review 69.   
18 Case C-438/05 International Transport Workers’ Federation (ITF) and Finnish Seamen’s 
Union (FSU) v Viking Line [2007] ECR I–0779 (Viking); Case C-341/05 Laval un Partneri v 
Svenska Byggnadsarbetareförbundet [2007] ECR I-11767 (Laval); Case C-346/06 Rüffert v 
Land Niedersachsen [2008] ECR I-1989 (Rüffert). 
19 Directive 96/71/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16.12.96 concerning 
the posting of workers in the framework of the provision of services [1997] O.J. L18/1 
(hereafter Posted Workers Directive). See A. Bücker and W. Warneck (eds), Reconciling 
Fundamental Social Rights and Economic Freedoms after Viking, Laval and Rüffert (Baden-
Baden: Nomos, 2011); and J.E. Dolvik, L. Eldring and J. Visser, ‘Setting Wage Floors in 
Open Markets: The Role of Social Partners in Europe’s Multilevel Governance’ in S. Evju 
(ed.), Regulating Transnational Labour in Europe: The Quandaries of Multilevel Governance 
(Oslo: University of Oslo, 2014).   
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so as to diminish inequalities of income. Secondly, migrant workers could be hired on terms 
equal to those in the domestic workforce, as is the basic principle advocated in International 
Labour Organisation (ILO) and United Nations (UN) Conventions,20 as well as under EU law 
as regards free movement of workers.21 However, as we will see, this principle of equal 
treatment has not been fully operative in relation to temporary migrant work. Instead, in the 
wake of the financial crisis, what has come to be known as ‘posted work’ increased across 
Europe, with numbers rising by up to 44.4% since 2010 (or 1.9 million workers).22 Under EU 
law, only legislation or collective agreements of universal application or those generally 
applicable can set minimum rates of pay for posted work.23 In the Laval case, action taken by 
Swedish trade unions to raise wages for posted workers in line with what counterparts were 
paid under the relevant collective agreement was found by the Court of Justice to be a breach 
of an employer’s freedom to provide services.24 The UK has no mechanisms by which to 
achieve legislative status for collective agreements, so that employers bringing posted 
workers to perform a contract for services need pay only the statutory national minimum 
wage, rather than sectoral wages that might be set by collective bargaining. This has enabled 
employers (as service providers) to undercut what would otherwise have been regarded as the 
going rate for the job.25   
 
If Brexit were not to proceed, there would still be a strong case for reform of UK collective 
labour law and EU law concerning posting. Perhaps some might speculate that, on leaving the 
EU, the precarity experienced by UK low paid and unskilled workers would diminish 
alongside the exploitation of posted workers. However, for various reasons, the problems 
outlined here are not so easily cured by Brexit, regardless of whether this is ‘soft’ or ‘hard’ in 
nature. There is, instead, a potential lesson for EU Member States, namely not to dismantle 
                                                          
20 For example, Article 6 of ILO Convention No. 97 concerning Migration for Employment 
(Revised) 1949; Article 10 of ILO Convention No. 143 on Migrant Workers (Supplementary 
Provisions) 1975 and Article 25 of UN International Convention on the protection of the 
Rights of all Migrant Workers and their Families 1990 (ICRMW). 
21 Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), Article 45(2).  
22 Commission Proposal to amend the Posted Workers Directive COM(2016) 128 final at 2. 
23Posted Workers Directive n. 19, Art. 3(8) as interpreted in Rüffert n.18. 
24 Laval n. 18. 
25 See discussion of the East Lindsey and other disputes in C. Kilpatrick, ‘Laval’s Regulatory 
Conundrum: Collective Standard-Setting and the Court’s New Approach to Posted Workers’ 
(2009) European Law Review 844, also below at text accompanying ns 99 - 102. 
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but rather to re-establish systems of collective bargaining threatened during the sovereign 
debt crisis.  
    
2. COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AND EQUALITY 
 
A trade union seeks to represent the collective interests of the workers that constitute its 
membership. In this way, a union can counteract the superior bargaining power that the 
possession of capital and other wealth gives to the individual or corporate entity that is the 
employer.26 Hence, in the UK, prior to 1982, as Lewis and Simpson noted:  
dominant state policy in industrial relations reflected a collectivist ethic. This assumed 
that the only viable way in which workers could protect themselves from the 
inequality of the individual employment relation was through trade union 
organisation, and also that collectively regulated industrial relations benefited society 
as a whole as well as trade unionists.27  
Article 3 of ILO Convention No. 87 acknowledges that, in order to perform this role, trade 
unions have to be free ‘to draw up their constitutions and rules, to elect their representatives 
in full freedom, to organise their administration and activities and to formulate their 
programmes’ without interference from public authorities.28 In this way, solidarity between 
workers has the capacity to ‘create better treatment at work, transparency over the terms of 
that treatment and representation when agreed standards are not met or procedures not 
followed’.29 This does not, of course, necessarily equate to the promotion of equal treatment 
on grounds of sex and race. 
 
As regards sexual and racial discrimination, trade unions have had rather chequered histories.  
A trade union will reflect the views of its membership and, if these are sexist or racist, the 
collective bargaining strategies pursued are unlikely to lead to greater equality. So, in South 
Africa, whites-only trade unions protected certain privileges (‘the white standard’) for white 
                                                          
26 See reference to the work of Otto Kahn Freund in P. Davies and M. Freedland, Kahn-
Freund’s Labour and the Law, 3rd ed. (London: Stevens, 1983), 18. 
27 R. Lewis and B. Simpson, ‘Disorganising Industrial Relations: An analysis of sections 2-8 
and 10-14 of the Employment Act 1982’ (1982) 11 ILJ 227 at 244. 
28 ILO Convention No. 87 on Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organise 
1948, Art. 3.  
29 Hayes and Novitz n.16 at 14-15. 
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workers in the labour market;30 while, in the UK, male dominated trade unions secured 
collective agreements instantiating differential male and female wages (and bonuses).31 
Nevertheless, the internal logic of trade unions, turning on the utility of solidarity, is such that 
the more representative they are, the more effective. Instead of an employer being able to 
divide and rule the workforce, to dictate terms and conditions that can be taken or left, unity 
in representation can lead to actual negotiation. So, some considerable time prior to the 
abolition of apartheid, many white workers joined forces with those of colour in the Congress 
of South African Trade Unions (COSATU) which was instrumental in organising protest and 
political change in South Africa.32 In the UK, the Trades Union Congress (TUC) adopted in 
1981 a ‘Black Workers Charter’ and now campaigns actively on race-related issues.33 
Adoption of a ‘Charter for Equality for Women within Trade Unions’ came even earlier in 
1979 and today women make up the majority of trade union membership. Black workers are 
more likely than white workers to be trade union members, with black female workers more 
likely still.34 The TUC now has its first female General Secretary, Frances O’Grady, a 
development which arguably makes the institution more representative of its membership.35  
That is not to say that the workers that the TUC and its constituent unions represent are in any 
sense homogeneous. There are considerable challenges in regulating conflicts of interest, but 
                                                          
30 J. Knight and M. McGrath, The Erosion of Apartheid in the South African Labour Market: 
Measures and Mechanisms (Oxford: Institute of Economics and Statistics, 1987) at 39; see 
for the beginnings of this type of activism Murdoch v Bullough (1923) TPD 495. 
31 See L. Dickens, ‘Collective Bargaining and the Promotion of Gender Equality at Work: 
Opportunities and Challenges for Trade Unions’ (2000) 6(2) Transfer 193. Regarding the 
established bonuses for male workers, see Allen v GMB  [2008] ICR 1407 (CA) discussed by 
S. Deakin, S. Fraser Butlin, C. McLaughlin and A. Polanska, ‘Are Litigation and Collective 
Bargaining Complements of Substitutes for Achieving Gender Equality? A study of the 
British Equal Pay Act’ (2015) 39 Cambridge Journal of Economics 381 at 390 – 392.  
32 See S. Buhlungu, M. Brookes and G. Wood, ‘Trade Unions and Democracy in South 
Africa: Union organizational challenges and solidarities in a time of transformation (2008) 
46(3) British Journal of Industrial Relations (BJIR) 439. Its current objectives are stated to be 
as follows: ‘COSATU believes in a democratic society free of racism, sexism and the 
exploitation of the working class.’ See http://www.cosatu.org.za/show.php?ID=926&categ= 
(accessed 9 November 2016). See also D. Budlender, Gender Equality and Social Dialogue 
in South Africa Working Paper 2/11 (Geneva: ILO, 2011) available at 
http://www.oit.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---dgreports/---
gender/documents/publication/wcms_150430.pdf (accessed 9 November 2016).  
33 See https://www.tuc.org.uk/equality-issues/black-workers (accessed 9 November 2016); 
see also S. Moore and S. Tailby, ‘The Changing Face of Employment Relations: Equality and 
Diversity’ (2015) 37(6) Employee Relations  705 at 708.  
34 Moore and Tailby (2015) n.33 at 708 – 709. 
35 See also the TUC Equality Audit Report 2016 at 
https://www.tuc.org.uk/EqualityAudit2016 (accessed 9 November 2016). 
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the broader objective of solidarity as a source of bargaining power tends to prompt genuine 
attempts at inclusion.36   
 
In 1989, Bob Simpson made the prescient comment that ‘weakening trade unions will 
undoubtedly limit the achievement of equal pay for work of equal value… It is the pursuit of 
"equal value" through collective bargaining which will largely determine the effects of this 
change in the law in the long term’.37 It emerges that, statistically, an employer that 
recognises a trade union for collective bargaining over pay and other terms and conditions is 
more likely to implement equal opportunities. Union recognition has been linked to 
employers offering financial assistance for childcare and opportunities to switch from full- to 
part-time work.38 There is also evidence of a connection between union interventions and 
reduction of the gender pay gap.39   
 
In industries where there is a dramatic reduction in trade union membership and collective 
bargaining, the consequence would seem to be a reduction in income for workers. 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) researchers observing this phenomenon are adamant that 
there is a causative connection.40 Reasoning from first principles, a link would make sense. 
For example, the reason that sectoral collective bargaining leads to better outcomes for 
                                                          
36 A.C.L. Davies, ‘”Half a Person”: A Legal Perspective on Organizing and Representing 
“Non-Standard” Workers’ in A. Bogg and T. Novitz (eds), Voices at Work: Continuity and 
Change in the Common Law World (Oxford: OUP, 2014) offers a concerned and critical 
approach to the ability of unions and legislators to make provision for this diverse workforce. 
In the same volume, J. Fine, ‘Migrant Workers and Labour Movements in the US and the 
UK’ (at 67 – 95), while admitting the scale of the challenges, offers a more positive view of 
union attempts to engage with migrant workers as members.  
37 B. Simpson, ‘Women, Employment and European Equality Law by Christopher 
McCrudden’ (1989) 52(3) Modern Law Review 445 at 446. 
38 See H. Bewley and S. Fernier, ‘What Do Unions Do for Women?’ in H. Gospel and S. 
Wood, Representing Workers: Union Recognition and Membership in Britain (London/New 
York: Routledge, 2003) at 117. 
39 Eurofound, Addressing the Gender Pay Gap: Government and social partner actions 
(2010) http://www.eurofound.europa.eu/docs/eiro/tn0912018s/tn0912018s.pdf; and F.D. Blau 
and L.M. Kahn, ‘International Differences in the Gender Pay Gap’ (2003) 21(1) Journal of 
Labor Economics 106. See also Hayes and Novitz n.16 at 20-21. 
40 C. Holmes and K. Mayhew, Are UK Markets Polarising? SKOPE Research Paper No.97 
(Oxford: SKOPE, 2010); B. Western and J. Rosenfeld, ‘Unions, Norms and the Rise in US 
Wage Inequality’ (2011) 76(4) American Sociological Review 513. See F. Jaumotte and C. O. 
Buitron, ‘Power from the People’ (2015) Finance and Development 29 - 31 available at: 
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/fandd/2015/03/pdf/jaumotte.pdf (accessed 9 November 
2016). 
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workers is that employers ‘cannot easily escape collective agreements by switching to a non-
union environment, at least when staying in the same sector and country’.41 Indeed, in some 
countries that have strong sectoral bargaining, like the Netherlands, attempts to cheapen 
wages through outsourcing can lead to the perverse outcome of an increase in trade union 
activities enhancing coverage in previously unrepresented modes of work, such as agency 
and fixed term contracts.42 Further, when there is ‘extension’ of a collective agreement, that 
is ‘explicit legislation mandating the government, a public agency or… the court to apply the 
collective agreement beyond its signatories’, levels of inequality in wages are further 
reduced.43 Simultaneously, extension makes it ‘less risky for employers to sign a sectoral 
collective agreement as it exposes them less to below-standard competition’ and reduces 
consumer pressure for wages to drop.44    
 
3. THE TOXIC COMBINATION OF UK LEGISLATION AND EU LAW 
AFFECTING COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 
 
The end-state equality in wages that follows from effective sectoral collective bargaining can 
be explained by the ways in which unions ‘help institutionalize norms of equity’.45 The 
procedural ability to realise this equality agenda rests then on the scope for voice and 
inclusion within trade unions and collective bargaining structures. Arguably, in both the UK 
and EU contexts, this is what has been lost when those whose status is not formally that of 
‘worker’ or ‘employee’ have been left outside statutory protections.46 Further, the 
dismantling of UK collective labour protections when combined with EU law affecting the 
                                                          
41 Visser n.16 at 5. 
42 Ibid., at 5-6. 
43 Ibid., at 6. 
44 Ibid. 
45 Western and Rosenfeld n.40 at 513. See also D. Checchi, J. Visser and H.G. van de 
Werfhorst, ‘Inequality and Union Membership: The Influence of Relative Earnings and 
Inequality Attitudes’ (2010) 48(1) BJIR 84. bjir_7574..108 
46 See M. Freedland and N. Kountouris, ‘Some Reflections on the “Personal Scope” of 
Collective Labour Law’, this volume; also V. De Stefano, ‘Non-Standard Work and Limits 
on Freedom of Association: A Human Rights-Based Approach’ (2016) ILJ dww034, 
forthcoming available at: 
http://ilj.oxfordjournals.org/content/early/2016/10/18/indlaw.dww034.abstract (accessed 9 
November 2016); and T. Novitz, ‘Changes in Employment Status under Austerity and 
Beyond – Implications for Freedom of Association’ (2016) 39(1) Dublin University Law 
Journal, forthcoming, available at: 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2830472 (accessed 9 November 2016).  
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scope for collective bargaining, has arguably led to inequality and precarity in the British 
labour market which (as noted above) can be linked to the voting profiles of those who opted 
for Brexit.  
 
A. UK collective labour legislation and its limitations 
 
Scope for participation in collective bargaining can be influenced profoundly by the 
legislative framework, so that the reforms undertaken in the UK from 1981 onwards, 
designed to reduce the power of trade unions, remain of considerable relevance.47 Bob 
Simpson offered contemporary commentary on these developments. Established forms of 
union organisation and recognition which had supported national-level sectoral collective 
bargaining were stripped away. Instead, preference was given to the entitlement of the 
individual to disassociate from the union.48 The statutory recognition procedure introduced by 
New Labour favoured only enterprise bargaining and failed to offer an effective alternative 
for multi-employer bargaining arrangements.49 Further, the substantive scope of lawful 
industrial action was gradually diminished, so that secondary action could not be taken in 
solidarity with the workers of another employer. To these restrictions were added extensive 
statutory requirements associated with notice and balloting supplemented by a Code of 
Practice. 50 Moreover, employers sought injunctive relief which they understood would be on 
the basis of American Cyanamid principles, namely an arguable case that the action was 
unlawful (whether on substantive or procedural grounds) and that the balance of convenience 
lay with the employer.51 While Elias LJ has now stressed the significance of the 
                                                          
47 See P. Davies and M. Freedland, Labour Legislation and Public Policy (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1993), ch. 9. In this respect, see also a partial rejection of some of the assumptions 
implicit in the theories of collective laissez faire, explained and examined in A. Bogg and T. 
Novitz, ‘Recognition in Respect of Bargaining in the United Kingdom: Collective Autonomy 
and Political Neutrality in Context’ in B. Creighton and A. Forsyth, Rediscovering Collective 
Bargaining (New York/London: Routledge, 2012). 
48 See Lewis and Simpson n.27 at 244; also B. Simpson, ‘Freedom of Association and the 
Right to Organize: The Failure of an Individual Rights Strategy’ (1995) 24(3) ILJ 235.  
49  See the Trade Union and Labour Relations (Consolidation) Act 1992, Schedule A1; also 
B. Simpson, ‘Trade Union Recognition and the Law, A New Approach – Pts I and II of 
Schedule A1 to the Trade Union and Labour Relations (Consolidation) Act 1992’ (2000) 29 
ILJ 193; and A. Bogg, The Democratic Aspects of Trade Union Recognition (Oxford: Hart, 
2009).  
50 B. Simpson, ‘Strike Ballots and the Law: Round 6’ (2005) 34(4) ILJ 331. 
51 N. Countouris and M. Freedland, Injunctions, Cyanamid and the Corrosion of the Right to 
Strike in the UK, UCL Working Paper, LRI WP 1/2010, UCL, London 2010. 
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internationally recognised right to strike in applying judicial discretion in such cases,52 so that 
the legislation is not to be interpreted strictly against trade union interests, there still remain 
considerable obstacles to taking industrial action.53 These have, notably, been criticised by 
the European Committee of Social Rights (ECSR) in 2015.54  
 
The ECSR considers that the restrictions placed in the UK on the substance of lawful 
industrial action, the legislative requirement to give notice before holding a ballot and the 
limited protections given from dismissal together constitute a breach of Article 6(4) of the 
European Social Charter 1961. In particular, the Committee has said regarding the ban on 
secondary action: 
The Committee considers that employees nowadays often do not work solely for and 
under the direction of a single clearly defined employer, as evidenced by outsourcing, 
working in networked organisations, the formation of inter-organisational 
partnerships, particularly in public services, but also more use of agency staff, 
secondments and joint partnership working. The result is a far more diverse and 
complex matrix of contractual relationships with workers who used to share the same 
employer being split amongst different employers, even while they may find 
themselves simultaneously brought together with workers from other industries under 
new employment arrangements. As a consequence, trade unions increasingly find 
themselves representing a workforce whose terms and conditions are to a large extent 
not determined by their direct employer.55 
 
In other words, UK legislation on secondary action leaves workers exposed and without 
forms of solidarity in collective bargaining, even though their employers could be regarded as 
closely related through contractual and other corporate ties. An attempt to challenge this 
aspect of British collective labour law under Article 11 of the European Convention on 
Human Rights was, however, unsuccessful.56 The Trade Union Act 2016 did nothing to 
                                                          
52 RMT v Serco Ltd [2011] ICR 848 (CA) at [68] – [72].  
53 See B. Simpson, ‘The Labour Injunction and Industrial Action Ballots’ 42(1) (2013) ILJ 
54; also Simpson and Elgar n.1, this issue. 
54 See the 2015 Conclusions of the European Committee of Social Rights (ECSR) XX-3, at 
21 – 24. 
55 Ibid. See http://hudoc.esc.coe.int/eng/#{"ESCDcIdentifier":["XX-3/def/GBR/6/4/EN"]} 
(accessed 9 November 2016).  
56 (2015) 60 EHRR 10; on which see A. Bogg and K.D. Ewing, ‘The Implications of the 
RMT Case’ (2014) 43 ILJ 221.  
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ameliorate this situation but further added to the already complex balloting and notice 
requirements,57 while also introducing new challenges for trade union political funds, facility 
time and check off, as well as a more problematic role for the Certification Officer.58 
Concerns raised by the International Labour Organisation (ILO) Committee of Experts as 
regards the scope of these additional restrictions had no notable impact on Conservative 
government policy.59 
 
As Ruth Dukes notes in her analysis of British contemporary labour law commentary, the 
reforms from 1981 - 1997 have been understood as ‘one element of a wider set of measures 
intended to effect a restructuring of the labour market’, so as to overcome inflationary 
pressures associated with collective bargaining and achieve market-led efficiencies.60 
Significantly, she offers an alternative (and preferable) constitutional perspective on the 
socially-embedded aspects of labour law.  
 
It is perhaps doubtful whether the economic performance sought through a move away from 
national level sectoral bargaining was actually achieved,61 especially given the long term 
superior performance of countries like Germany which preserved sectoral bargaining 
alongside enterprise based works councils. Nevertheless, Margaret Thatcher’s initial reforms 
have had many of their intended effects on British industrial relations systems, stripping away 
the closed shop, sectoral bargaining and secondary action, so as to create extremely flexible 
labour market structures. Those changes have, in the main, been consolidated rather than 
ameliorated by subsequent legislation.  
 
                                                          
57 See Trade Union Act 2016 (TUA), ss 2 – 10 as discussed by R. Dukes and N. Kountouris, 
‘Pre-Strike Ballots, Picketing and Protest: Banning Industrial Action by the Back Door?’ 
(2016) 45(3) ILJ 337. 
58 TUA, ss 11  - 14. See A. Bogg, ‘Beyond Neo-Liberalism: The Trade Union Act 2016 and 
the Authoritarian State’ (2016) 45(3) ILJ 299; and S. Cavalier and Richard Arthur, ‘A 
Discussion of Certification Officer Reforms’ (2016) 45(3) ILJ 363. 
59  K.D. Ewing and J. Hendy, ‘The Trade Union Act 2016 and the Failure of Human Rights’ 
(2016) 45(3) ILJ 391; ILO Committee of Experts on the Application of Conventions and 
Recommendations (CEACR), Observations on Freedom of Association and Protection of the 
Right to Organise Convention No. 87 1948 - United Kingdom (2016).  
60 R. Dukes, The Labour Constitution: The Enduring Idea of Labour Law (Oxford: OUP, 
2014) at 99; see also her over-arching analysis in ch. 5.  
61 See Brown et al, n. 17.  
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The effects on social solidarity are palpable. Coverage by collective bargaining was at 82% in 
1980, stood at 23% in 2011 and is probably 20% or less today.62 As at 2011, the Workplace 
Employee Relations Survey (WERS) also reported that in the private sector there is sectoral 
bargaining in only 6.7% of workplaces.63 Levels of inequality of income and wealth are 
significant, with marked disparities between different geographical areas in the UK; the 
North, the Midlands and Wales being disproportionately affected.64 The majority of those 
experiencing poverty are also ‘in work’, so the ways in which the labour market operates has 
considerable implications for their welfare, especially in the austerity-related reduction of 
state services which previously might have operated as a cushion.65 Further, precarity in the 
workplace, through new forms of hiring, including false self-employment, agency work and 
new forms of hiring have reached such levels,66 that the current Government has initiated a 
review of these working practices.67 Social discontent is understandably high among low-
income working people, mapping onto the Brexit data as to where votes to leave were 
concentrated, demographically and geographically.68 This is not, however, the entire picture. 
It helps to explain sources of concern and dissent, but not the anti-immigrant sentiment that 
also spurred the vote.  
 
                                                          
62 Department for Business Innovation and Skills, Trade Union Membership 2012 (2013) 
Statistical Bulletin BIS/13/P77. See also K.D. Ewing, J. Hendy and C. Jones (eds), A 
Manifesto for Labour Law: Towards a comprehensive revision of workers’ rights (Liverpool: 
Institute of Employment Rights, 2016), at 18.  
63 See the 2011 Workplace Employee Relations Survey statistical data available at: 
https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/the-2011-workplace-employment-relations-
study-wers-transparency-data (accessed 9 November 2016) CF. JRF n.9. 
64 The UK has the third highest levels of inequality in the EU after Greece and Spain. The 
richest 10% of households have 45% of the wealth, with 10% earning having an income of 
under £10,000 per year. See https://www.equalitytrust.org.uk/scale-economic-inequality-uk.   
65 See https://www.jrf.org.uk/mpse-2015/work-poverty (accessed 9 November 2016). Data 
regarding in-work poverty has been confirmed by the Institute for Fiscal Studies: 
https://www.ifs.org.uk/publications/8371 (accessed 9 November 2016).  
66 See BIS Select Committee, Employment Practices at Sports Direct: Third Report of 
Session 2016-17 available at 
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201617/cmselect/cmbis/219/219.pdf?utm_sourc
e=219&utm_medium=module&utm_campaign=modulereports (accessed 9 November 2016); 
also D Pyper and J Delebarre, Zero-Hours Contracts (2016) available at  
http://researchbriefings.parliament.uk/ResearchBriefing/Summary/SN06553 (accessed 9 
November 2016).  
67 https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2016/oct/01/i-tell-theresa-may-working-
lives-review-modern-employment-zero-hours-flexibility (accessed 9 November 2016). 
68 See ns 6 - 9 above.  
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B. EU internal market law and its effects 
 
Also relevant, then, has been the scope of EU law and its impact on the UK labour market. 
Ostensibly, the arguments for Brexit hinge on ‘free movement of workers’, an entitlement 
arising by virtue of what is now Article 45 of the TFEU, which requires inter alia ‘the 
abolition of any discrimination based on nationality between workers of the Member States 
as regards employment, remuneration and other conditions of work and employment’.69 This 
is consistent with the standard principle of non-discrimination for those migrant workers 
entitled by law to reside and work in another country.70 It is well-established that all EU 
workers are entitled to form and join trade unions in another EU Member State and to engage 
in collective bargaining and industrial action in the same way as other local workers. Such a 
worker ‘shall enjoy equality of treatment as regards membership of trade unions and the 
exercise of rights attaching thereto’.71 However, by virtue Article 153(5) of the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), the legislative competence of the EU ‘shall not 
apply to pay, the right of association, the right to strike or the right to impose lock-outs’. This 
exclusion is controversial, given competence regarding social dialogue and consultation 
rights, alongside the capacity of EU institutions to place limitations on access to association 
and strikes in the context of free movement.72   
 
In tabloid newspapers, there has been the expression of concern that workers from 27 other 
EU Member States have unrestricted access to the UK for work, as well as superior public 
services and benefit schemes. In reality, this has not been the case. The evidence suggests that 
immigrants, particularly from the European Economic Area (EEA) exercising free movement 
rights, make a substantial net contribution to the UK economy. They tend to come with skills, 
and contribute more substantially to the UK tax base than they draw on UK revenues.73 This 
                                                          
69 TFEU, Art. 45(2). 
70 See above n.20. 
71 Article 8 of Regulation (EU) No 492/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council 
of 5 April 2011 on Freedom of Movement for Workers within the Union L141/1, 27.05.2011.  
72 Lord Wedderburn, ‘Consultation and Collective Bargaining in Europe: Success or 
Ideology?’ (1997) 26(1) ILJ 1; Lord Wedderburn, ‘Labour Law 2008: 40 Years On’ (2007) 
36(4) ILJ 397; and T. Novitz, ‘The EU and the Right to Strike: Regulation through 
the Back Door and Its Impact on Social Dialogue’ (2016) 27(1) King's Law Journal 46.  
73 C. Dustmann and T. Frattini, ‘The Fiscal Effects of Immigration to the UK’ (2014) 
124(580) The Economic Journal,  F593-F643; confirming findings in C. Dustman, T. Frattini 
and C. Halls, ‘Assessing the Fiscal Costs and Benefits of A8 Migration to the UK’ (2010) 
31(1) Fiscal Studies 1. 
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seems to be appreciated by British workers in larger cities who have greater personal 
experience of the positive contribution that EEA immigrants make, as opposed to those in 
less cosmopolitan places where perceptions may be dominated instead by media treatment of 
the issues.74  
 
Certainly, the TUC has not taken the view that EU migrants exercising their free movement 
rights take British jobs, or sought to block their access to the UK labour market. Rather, the 
TUC and affiliated unions have sought to seek to recruit EEA migrants as members and to 
assist them in collective bargaining.75 This is not always straightforward. The facts of the 
Kalwak case,76 in which Polish ‘self-employed’ agency workers were dismissed for 
attempting to join a union, is illustrative of employer practices in this regard and the ongoing 
barriers for trade union recruitment.77 The issues of language barriers and lack of trade union 
access to the workplace are compounded by the attempts made by certain employers to 
exploit a more vulnerable group of workers.     
 
However, the more obvious difficulty regarding treatment of EU immigrants arises less in 
cases where workers are exercising their free movement rights, under which they are fully 
entitled to claim the same entitlements as British workers to trade union membership and 
combine with them in collective bargaining, but rather in relation to temporary ‘posted’ 
workers. Article 1(3) of the Posted Workers Directive envisages three ways in which posting 
can take place: through a contract between the undertaking employing the posted worker in 
one State and the party for whom the services are intended in another; via an inter-corporate 
transfer within a company or group of companies across EU national boundaries; or where an 
                                                          
74 This may explain the London and Bristol votes in favour of Remain. See text 
accompanying ns 8 - 9. 
75 B. Anderson, N. Clark, and V. Parutis, New EU Members? Migrant Workers’ Challenges 
and Opportunities to UK Trade Unions: A Polish and Lithuanian Case Study (London: TUC, 
2007); see also TUC, Organising Migrant Workers: A National Strategy (2006). 
76 Consistent Group Ltd v Kalwak and others [2008] IRLR 505 (CA); see also L. Barmes, 
‘Learning from Case Law Accounts of Marginalised Working’ in J. Fudge, S. McCrystal and 
K. Sankaran (eds), Challenging the Legal Boundaries of Work Regulation (Oxford: Hart, 
2012). 
77 One would, however, hope that the precedent established by the Supreme Court in 
Autoclenz v Belcher [2011] ICR 1157 (SC) on shams would assist in addressing the treatment 
of workers in that case; however, where independent contractor status is genuinely 
established, it seems that obstacles to entitlement to collective bargaining rights would 
remain. See n.46 above.  
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agency hires out a worker from one Member State to a user undertaking in another Member 
State.78 In any of these scenarios, it is not the posted worker who is exercising rights to free 
movement, but the employer or agency which is exercising an entitlement to ‘freedom to 
provide services’ under Article 56 TFEU.  Posting of workers is important in construction, 
manufacturing, road transport, processing and in various service sectors, including care, 
medical and business services. It also arises in terms of seasonal agricultural work.79 Posting 
through agencies is also becoming a more common phenomenon,80 although the most 
vulnerable remain the posted workers operating at the end of lengthy commercial supply 
chains.81  
  
In this process, it is assumed that the law governing the employment relationship will 
normally remain that of the posted worker’s State of origin, with the host State (the UK) only 
being able to impose certain core terms and conditions as to the hire of such workers, as set 
out in Article 3 of the Posted Workers Directive. These terms concern provisions relating to 
pay, hours and holidays, health and safety, provision for pregnant workers and maternity 
leave, and equality of treatment between men and women, as well as ‘other provisions on 
non-discrimination’. As noted above, these are to be set through legislation, but also through 
collective agreement if of universal application or generally applicable.  
 
Perhaps ironically, given the reference to ‘non-discrimination’ in Article 3(1), this approach 
allows discrimination between posted workers and workers of the host State (or, for our 
purposes, ‘British workers’). Equality law might have assisted in preventing discrimination 
on grounds of national origin, but the UK Supreme Court has recently found that 
discrimination on grounds of precarious immigration status does not fall under the ‘protected 
category’ of race. Consequently, temporary migrant status would be unlikely to qualify for 
protection on grounds of  racial discrimination,82 meaning  posted workers may legitimately 
be paid at lower rates than local workers for performing the same work (unless perhaps they 
                                                          
78 Posted Workers Directive, n.19 above. 
79 European Commission, Commission Staff Working Document, Impact Assessment, 
Strasbourg, 8.3.2016 SWD(2016) 52 final, at 8. 
80 R. Andrijasevic and D. Sacchetto, ‘“Disappearing Workers”: Foxconn in Europe and the 
Changing Role of Temporary Work Agencies’ (2016) Work, Employment and Society 1. 
81 See n.79, at 14-15. 
82 Joined cases Onu v Akwiwu and Taiwo v Olaigbe [2016] IRLR 719 (SC). 
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can come within the scope of statutory protections for temporary agency workers).83 
Moreover, the Posted Workers Directive, while recognising the potential role of collective 
agreements at setting their terms and conditions in the host State, gives them no express 
entitlement to join local trade unions or to engage in collective bargaining.  
 
As noted above, in the Laval case, the European Court of Justice found controversially that 
industrial action taken by Swedish trade unions to persuade a service provider to comply with 
the terms of the local applicable Swedish collective agreement was in breach of the terms of 
the Posted Workers Directive and Article 56 TFEU.84 While recognising a right to strike 
(under inter alia Art. 28 of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights), the Court nevertheless 
significantly limited its scope, leading to criticism from the ILO.85 The Court of Justice has 
indicated now that local trade unions may at least assist posted workers in individual claims 
regarding non-payment of wages to which they were clearly entitled.86 That judgment maps 
onto the content of a Posted Workers Enforcement Directive of 2014, which make specific 
reference to the role of trade unions in the enforcement of posted workers’ rights.87 
Nevertheless, the UK Regulations implementing this Directive (effective as at June 2016) do 
not mention the role of trade unions as agents for enforcement and are limited to the 
enforcement of posted workers’ rights in the construction sector.88 
                                                          
83 See Directive 2008/104/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 November 
2008 on temporary agency work; cf. Agency Worker Regulations 2010 SI 2010/93. For 
critical comment on the limitations of these regulatory instruments, see L. Vosko, ‘Less Than 
Adequate: Regulating Temporary Agency Work in the EU in the Face of an Internal Market 
in Services’ (2009) 2(3) Cambridge Journal of Regions, Economy and Society 395; N. 
Countouris and R. Horton, ‘The Temporary Agency Work Directive: Another Broken 
Promise?’ (2009) 38(3) ILJ 329.  
84 Laval n. 18; see also for exploration of the Nordic context for this decision, the work of the 
FORMULA project led by Professor Stein Evju in S. Evju (ed), Cross-border Services, 
Posting of Workers, and Multilevel Governance (Oslo: University of Oslo, 2013); and S. Evju 
(ed.), Regulating Transnational Labour in Europe: The Quandaries of Multilevel Governance 
(Oslo: University of Oslo, 2014). 
85 See Observations on Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organise 
Convention No. 87 1948 - United Kingdom (2010) at 208–09; and Report (2013) at 196. 
86 See also Case 396/13 Sähköalojen ammattiliitto ry v Elektrobudowa Spółka Akcyjna, 
judgment of 12 February 2015.  
87 Directive 2014/67/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 May 2014 on 
the enforcement of Directive 96/71/EC concerning the posting of workers in the framework 
of the provision of services and amending Regulation (EU) No 1024/2012 on administrative 
cooperation through the Internal Market Information System (‘the IMI Regulation’) Text 
with EEA relevance (the Enforcement Directive), especially Art. 11(3). 
88 The Posted Workers (Enforcement of Employment Rights) Regulations 2016 SI 2016/539.  
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In response to successful challenges brought under EU law to the applicability in public 
procurement of minimum wages set by regional collective agreement and not instantiated in 
legislation,89 German national and local government have taken legislative initiatives to give 
effect to differentiated sectoral wages.90 This means that service providers are given 
sufficient notice as to the ‘mandatory rules sufficient to provide minimum protection’,91 such 
as the minimum wages that are due to be paid to posted workers in a particular sector or 
region. Those rates may exceed any bare national minimum wage, but still focus on the 
minima payable for work within a sector in ways that thwart what we might traditionally 
understand as the purpose of collective bargaining, which is to enhance workers’ welfare 
beyond such limited ambitions.92  
 
The UK has no system for the legal extension of collective agreements comparable to that 
adopted by Germany. There remains a presumption that collective agreements are not to be 
treated as legally binding inter partes93 although terms and conditions from such a source 
may be incorporated into an individual contract of employment. Further, mechanisms for 
sectoral bargaining which might have enabled collective agreements of general application 
have been dismantled and, at present, no UK government has been prepared to contemplate 
the legal extension of collective agreements to all workers in a sector, setting differentiated 
minimum wages for particular work in a given sector, even though remains possible in 
countries like Germany and the Netherlands. This lack is the subject of proposals made by the 
Institute of Employment Rights in their Manifesto for Labour Law.94  
 
All migrant workers (whether temporarily posted to the UK, those who exercise their free 
movement rights or those in permanent residence) have an entitlement to what has come to be 
                                                          
89 See Rüffert n. 18; also Case C-271/08 Commission v Germany [2010] ECR I-6817.  
90 The Court of Justice in Case C-115/14 RegioPost GmbH & Co. KG v Stadt Landau in der 
Pfalz, judgment of 17 November 2015, recognised the legal effect of German regional 
legislation which set minimum wages to be applied in the context of public procurement 
decisions. Notably, although the regional legislation had drawn on rates set by a pre-existing 
collective agreement, there was at that time no such collective agreement. The rates were set 
solely by legislation.  
91 Rüffert n.18, paras 32 – 34. 
92 Kilpatrick n.25 at 853-4. 
93 TULRCA 1992, s. 179. 
94 Ewing et al n.62 at 20 – 21. 
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termed the minimum wage. However, as Bob Simpson noted shortly after introduction of the 
national minimum wage, and in the subsequent manifestations of its review, this offers a low 
base line of equality to be supplemented by superior collective bargaining structures.95 If the 
norm for those posted temporarily is the minimum wage and not the collectively bargained 
wage, then there is scope for what the European Commission has observed, namely 
substantial undercutting of wages, which has depressive effects on wage rates locally, as well 
as pricing local workers out of jobs they previously expected to do.96   
 
It is the posted worker scenario, which enables employers to pay minimum wages rather than 
going rates for work, which may well have engendered economic shocks and resentments in 
areas, such as the North, the Midlands and in Wales, where it seems more of this type of 
posting has taken place, particularly in construction and processing.97 The disruption that 
posted work arrangements can cause is perhaps best exemplified by the East Lindsey Oil 
Refinery dispute, which related to the ability of local workers to apply for jobs at the 
Lincolnshire oil refinery. A services contract had been awarded at the refinery to an Italian 
company, which undertook to supply its own skilled workforce, consisting of Portuguese and 
Italian workers. These workers were duly posted in and housed in isolated conditions on a 
barge moored in nearby Grimsby. Their wages and living conditions led local workers to be 
convinced that not only had they lost the ability to apply for jobs that would otherwise have 
been available to them, but that the cost of their labour was being undercut. This was an 
allegation that a subsequent ACAS investigation was unable to confirm or deny, despite an 
undertaking that had been given to pay the going rates.98  
 
The incident sparked spontaneous industrial action by British workers at East Lindsey and a 
number of sympathy walk outs in Grangemouth Oil Refinery, Aberthaw power station, near 
                                                          
95 B. Simpson, ‘The National Minimum Wage Five Years On: Reflections on Some General 
Issues’ (2005) 33(1) ILJ 22.   
96 European Commission, Commission Staff Working Document, Impact Assessment, 
Strasbourg, 8.3.2016 SWD(2016) 52 final, at 13 and 36; see also the extensive research 
conducted by J. Cremers, In Search of Cheap Labour in Europe: Working and Living 
Conditions of Posted Workers (Brussels: CLR Studies: European Institute for Construction 
Labour Research, 2011).  
97 See JRF, n.9 
98 ACAS, Report of an Inquiry into the Circumstances Surrounding the Lindsey Oil Refinery 
Dispute (2009), para. 11.  
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Barry, South Wales, and a refinery in Wilton near Redcar, Teesside, to name only a few.99 
The dispute became notorious for the catch-phrase ‘British jobs for British workers’ used in 
the associated protests.100 Workers could not be represented in the industrial action by a trade 
union as this would have been a clear violation of EU law, following the Laval case.101 Here, 
as subsequently, resentment came out of inequalities and was perhaps exacerbated by the 
absence of capacity for trade unions to be involved to mediate between different groups of 
workers and offer routes to reconciliation and solidarity.102  
 
Ongoing research in the field of temporary and seasonal posting to the UK indicate that 
employers prefer to employ cheaper posted workers while leaving local workers in an 
increasingly precarious position.103 In this situation, UK trade unions are exceptionally 
cautious regarding industrial action in support of collective bargaining where posted workers 
are involved, or where indeed, any EU cross-border situation arises. This is due to the 
longstanding realization that an application for injunctive relief could be brought by the 
employer on substantive grounds that would be expensive to defend, 104 but also more 
significantly, the potentially unlimited liability that could arise under EU law.105 
 
                                                          
99 Discussed in L. Hayes, T. Novitz and H. Reed, Applying the Laval Quartet in a UK 
Context: Chilling, Ripple and Disruptive Effects on Industrial Relations’ in Bücker and 
Warneck n.19. 
100 S. Morris, ‘'Give Jobs to British People' say Aberthaw power station protesters’, The 
Guardian, 30 January 2009; L. Holmwood, ‘BBC Apologises for Misleading Edit of Striking 
Worker’, The Guardian, 6 February 2009. 
101 See Laval  n.18 above. 
102 See for more detailed discussion of the dynamics of this situation, C. Barnard, ‘“British 
Jobs for British Workers’: The Lindsey Oil Refinery Dispute and the Future of Local Labour 
Clauses in an Integrated EU Market’ (2009) 38(3) ILJ 245; and A. Ince, D. Featherstone, A. 
Cumbers, D. MacKinnon and K. Strauss, ‘British Jobs for British Workers? Negotiating 
Work, Nation, and Globalisation through the Linsey Oil Refinery Disputes’ (2015) 47 
Antipode 139.  
103 S. Scott, ‘Migrant–Local Hiring Queues in the UK Food Industry’ (2013) 
19(5) Population, Space and Place 459; G. Meardi, A. Martín and M.L. Riera, ‘Constructing 
Uncertainty: Unions and Migrant Labour in Construction in Spain and the UK’ (2012) 
54(1) Journal of Industrial Relations 5. 
104 See Simpson ns 50 and 53.  
105 K. Apps, ‘Damages Claims Against Trade Unions After Viking and Laval’ (2009) 34 
European Law Review 141; discussed also in T. Novitz and P. Syrpis ‘Viking and Laval: The 
United Kingdom Report’ in M. Freedland and J. Prassl (eds), Viking and Laval and Beyond 
(Oxford: Hart Publishing. 2014). 
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In this context, EU law on free movement aimed at completion of the common market 
coincided with the limitations of UK collective labour legislation aimed at flexibilisation of 
labour markets. In so doing, their collision seems to have led to inequalities of income and 
concerns regarding migrant work. This has arguably been an important stage on the journey 
towards Brexit.  
 
4. CONCLUSION – HOW DOES THE JOURNEY END? 
 
This article has sought to explain the ways in which the combination of UK collective labour 
law and EU free movement laws, each with their own distinct market objectives, have 
combined to exacerbate inequalities and conflicts (or at least perceived conflicts) of interest 
between groups of workers. Together, they have had the effect of setting migrant workers 
against local workers. Given what we know now of demographics and geographies, we might 
tend towards the conclusion that this generated or exacerbated forms of resentment which 
may have influenced the Brexit vote.  
 
If Brexit does not take place, then there are clear and obvious steps that could be taken to 
promote greater access to collective bargaining, which would enable the reduction of 
inequalities of income and diminish tensions between ‘British’ and other workers. As UK 
unions have learnt, it is, of course, difficult to organise migrant workers, and even more 
difficult to encourage temporary posted workers to join unions and adequately protect their 
interests when they do so. Yet, representation of their voices is vital if collective bargaining is 
to operate in an inclusive and non-discriminatory way which genuinely promotes social 
solidarity. In this respect, the ‘diverse and complex matrix of contractual relationships’ an 
employer may have with discrete groups of longer-term, agency and posted workers pose 
obvious problems.106 Also, by the time significant gains have been achieved, many of those 
on temporary hirings will have moved on.  
 
Nevertheless, the experience of Dutch unions suggest greater rights of trade union access to 
the workplace can provide valuable assistance here, as can stronger laws enabling protection 
from victimization on grounds of trade union membership.107 Experience in Finland suggests 
                                                          
106 See the comments of the European Committee of Social Rights above at n.54.  
107 L. Bernstem and N. Lillie, ‘Hyper-mobile Migrant Workers and Dutch Trade Union 
Representation Strategies at the Eemshaven Construction Sites’ (2016) 37(1) Economic and 
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that trade union abilities to press for inspection of payment of wages and to take forms of 
boycott action against transgressing employers can also be helpful.108 Further, while the 
Laval case places significant limitations on industrial action seeking to raise the wages of 
posted workers, a system of sectoral bargaining accompanied by legal extension of collective 
agreements could make a difference.109 Such legal mechanisms will still set wages for posted 
workers at minimal rates of pay, but will be more sensitive to what is affordable for service 
providers in the job and the sector, so that where large profits are being made, posted workers 
are not only being paid the national minimum wage. Notably, sectoral bargaining has been 
most recently recommended by the Institute of Employment Rights as a key aspect of a 
Manifesto for Labour Law.110 At the very least, a system whereby trade unions are given the 
capacity to assist posted workers in their claims for unpaid wages is to be recommended.111   
 
That is not to say that reform is unnecessary at EU level. As various European academic 
commentators have observed, there is a strong argument that posted workers should have the 
same rights to freedom of association as those exercising free movement rights.112 Despite the 
failure of the attempt to regulation in the form of a ‘Monti II’ Regulation,113 the European 
Commission has indicated the need to address the scale of posting, which seems to have 
doubled since 2010, alongside its divisive effects.114 One proposal is a new measure for ‘sub-
contracting chains’ that would provide Member States with an option to apply remuneration 
                                                          
Industrial Democracy 171 at 179 where office hours on site made a difference; cf. M. 
Houwerzijl, ‘The Dutch Understanding of Posting of Workers in the Context of Free Services 
Provision and Enlargement: A Neutral Approach? Formula working paper no. 23, University 
of Oslo. In the UK, greater protection of trade union activity by agency workers could be of 
assistance – cf. Kalwak n.76 and Smith v Carillion [2015] IRLR 467 (CA). Ideally, access to 
the workplace would not be dependent on trade union recognition.  
108 N. Lille, ‘Subcontracting, Posted Migrants and Labour Market Segmentation in Finland 
(2012) 50(1) BJIR 148.  
109 Visser n.16 at 8;  
110 See ns 62 and 94 above. 
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levels established at company level and other applicable collective agreements to any 
subcontractor where posting of workers is envisaged.115 This will ‘only be possible on a 
proportionate and non-discriminatory basis and would thus in particular require that the same 
obligations be imposed on all national sub-contractors’.116 Such a rule could, if introduced, 
have considerable impact on conditions for posted (and local) workers in the UK, given the 
current absence of sectoral bargaining and legislative extension of collective agreements. But, 
the Commission only intends such a regulatory measure to be optional and, in the event that a 
directive amending the Posted Workers Directive were adopted, there is no guarantee that any 
of the Member States (let alone the UK) would exercise their option to do so. The reluctant 
and partial implementation by the UK of the Enforcement Directive117 does not bode well for 
the adoption of such measures in Britain.  
   
If Brexit lies at the end of the journey, then evidence would suggest that measures that 
promote collective bargaining and social dialogue would likely assist in promoting greater 
income equality and social cohesion. Repeal of the provisions in the Trade Union Act 2016 
would be a useful starting point. However, Brexit by itself seems unlikely to remove the root 
causes of tensions between British and migrant labour. This is true of both ‘’soft’ and ‘hard’ 
Brexit.118 
 
If there is ‘soft Brexit’, which might allow the UK to gain access to the common market, but 
not the full range of social, environmental and other regulations associated with actual 
membership of the EU, the UK will still have to abide by free market principles, including 
the free movement of persons and the freedom to provide services. As a recent EAA case, 
Holship Norge AS119 illustrates, this would mean that restrictions placed on industrial action 
would continue (in that case in accordance with free movement of establishment and 
competition law principles); whilst the UK government’s voice regarding the regulation of 
posted work would be reduced.  
                                                          
115 Commission proposal at n.22 at 11-12. 
116 Commission proposal at n.22 at 7-8. 
117 See text accompanying ns 87-88 above. 
118 A. Menon and B. Fowler, ‘Hard or Soft? The Politics of Brexit’ (2016) 238 National 
Institute Economic Review R4 at R8 – R10. 
119 Case E-14/15 Holship Norge AS v Norsk Transportarbeiderforbund, judgment of the 
EFTA Court of 19 April 2016, interpreting Articles 31, 53 and 54 EEA. Available at: 
http://www.eftacourt.int/fileadmin/user_upload/Files/Cases/2015/14_15/14_15_Judgment_E
N.pdf (accessed 9 November 2016). 
25 
 
 
Moreover, it is unlikely that ‘hard Brexit’, leaving the common market entirely, can offer a 
simple solution. While the UK would no longer be subject to EU law regarding free 
movement or the posted workers regime, similar scenarios are bound to arise. Any 
contemporary trade agreement relating to services is likely to contain provisions regarding 
temporary movement of natural persons, known under the General Agreement on Trade in 
Services (GATS), as ‘Mode 4’.120 We know from the experience of other States, such as 
Canada and New Zealand (NZ), that many of the same issues connected to posted work 
regarding jurisdiction, pay and collective bargaining will arise. For example, in Canada, since 
2006 the number of ‘temporary foreign workers’ on short term inter-corporate postings and 
seasonal circular agricultural visas has exceeded the number of longer term economic 
immigrants, which has led to genuine uncertainty as to the status of such workers under 
standard collective bargaining arrangements.121 At present, the UK has no capacity to record 
whether EU workers are exercising free movement rights or being ‘posted’; there may be 
much more of the latter than is currently thought. In NZ, there is current litigation concerning 
the application of a national level collective agreement to Chinese workers temporarily 
posted there.122 That dispute falls to be determined under the terms of a China – NZ Free 
Trade Agreement.123  
 
If the UK is to stand outside Europe, then we need to revisit the regime governing collective 
labour rights to generate forms of equal treatment that do not divide the workforce, but which 
can assist in fostering social and political harmony as they bolster mutual welfare. However, 
it has to be acknowledged that if we do indeed face ‘hard Brexit’, the UK government will be 
in the more difficult position of seeking to negotiate ad hoc individualized solutions to these 
problems, perhaps dealing with States like China, which have much more market power than 
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the UK. The scope to enhance our collective labour laws becomes further restricted, so that 
British workers’ jobs and pay become more precarious, not less so.   
 
Finally, the UK’s current predicament offers the rest of Europe a cautionary tale. In the wake 
of the financial crisis and ensuing sovereign debt crisis, EU institutions have pursued 
deregulatory policies in relation to labour markets. These policies have been promoted 
through formal ‘bailout’ and financial assistance packages124 and via the Country Specific 
Recommendations issued to Member States regarding their handling of their economies.125 
The tendency has been to recommend the abandonment of sectoral level bargaining (and 
legislative extension of collective agreements) in favour of enterprise level bargaining, often 
not involving trade unions at all.126 Commentators like Maarten Keune are already observing 
the developments in inequality that have followed.127 The UK story of the whittling away of 
collective bargaining and its consequences offers, at best, a salutary reminder that this is not a 
path that other EU States should follow.      
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